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THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
THE ancient principle of sovereign immunity from suit, long abandoned
by the United States in the field of contract, has been further undermined
by passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act,' which grants to the federal
courts jurisdiction over actions against the Government for the negligence
of its employees. The doctrine of immunity, inherited by this country from
eighteenth century English law, has been frequently attacked as an anach-
ronism unsuited to democratic society because of the unfairness to individ-
uals with just claims against the Government. More pragmatically, the
correlative system of private claim bills, primary channel through which
relief has been afforded to injured parties, has been denounced for usurpa-
tion of Congressional energies which might otherwise be devoted to con-
sideration of important national problems.2
The first response of Congress to these pressures was the establishment of
the Court of Claims in 1855, with jurisdiction over claims against the United
States founded upon any law of Congress or upon any contract, express or
implied.3 In 1887 the Tucker Act 4 granted concurrent jurisdiction to the
federal district courts in cases involving not more than $10,000. Although
it was argued that the statutes did not require such a construction, the
Supreme Court entirely excluded tort claims from the grants of jurisdiction.5
1. Pub. L. No. 601, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 2, 1946) Tit. IV, 15 U. S. L. WEEC 50;
92 Cong. Rec., July 26, 1946, at 10283. Hereafter cited as F.T.C.A. The Act is Title IV of
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. SEN. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess,
(1946) 29; Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress nrsuant to
H. Con. Res. 18, 79th Cong., lst Sess. (1945).
2. See the series of articles by Borchard: Government Liability in Tort (1924) 34 YALE
L. J. 1, 129, 229; Governmental Responsibility in Tort (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 1, 757, 1039;
(1928) 28 COL. L. RPv. 577, 734. See also the symposium, Governmental Tort Liability
(1942) 9 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. No. 2, particularly Holtzoff, The Handling of Tort Claims
Against The Federal Government, id. at 311. Also SEN. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1946) 30-1,- H. R. REP. No. 1675, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) 25.
3. REv. STAT. §§ 1049-58 (1875), 28U. S.C. § 241 etseq. (1940).
4. 24STAT. 505 (1887), 28 U.S. C. §§ 41(20), 250 (1) (2) (1940).
5. The Act of 1855 was interpreted as excluding torts on the basis of "the strongest
implication." Gibbons v. United States, 8 Wall. 269, 275 (U. S. 1868). The Tucker Act
conferred jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to hear "All claims founded upon the Constitu-
tion of the United States or any law of Congress . . .or upon any contract . . . or for
damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in cases notsoundingin tort. . . ." The issueas tohow
much of the sentence was controlled by the phrase "in cases not sounding in tort" was set-
tied in Schillinger v. United States, 155 U. S. 163, 168 (1894), where the Court held that no
action based on a tort would be considered whether founded upon the Constitution or not.
Moreover, to give the Court of Claims jurisdiction in a quantum meruit action, the contract
must be implied in fact, not merely in law. United States v. Minnesota Mut, Inves. Co.,
271 U. S. 212 (1926); United States v. Buffalo Pitts Co., 234 U. S. 228 (1914); Harley v.
United States, 198 U. S. 229 (1905). The Supreme Court seems on the verge of modifying
these long-standing rules, at least in the field of eminent domain. In United States v.
Causby, 66 Sup. Ct. 1062 (U. S. 1946), a case involving land situated near an airport used
by the Government, the court found that the noise and lights of low-passing planes con-
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Congressional reaction to that interpretation uras limited to piecemeal legis-
lation, such as that which permitted suit against the Government for patent
infringement and for maritime torts 6 and authorized settlement by Federal
agencies of claims for property damage in amounts ranging up to $1,00V
Government corporations created in recent years have been authorized to
sue and be sued in their own names, an authority which has been interpreted
in some cases to include damage suits for limited classes of torts.8
With Congress still burdened by thousands of claim bills at every session,
several attempts have recently been made by legislators to transfer this
burden to the courts by enacting a general tort claims law. After unsuccess-
ful efforts in 1929, 1940, and 1942, Congress may finally have solved the
major part of the problem through the instant Act."°
stituted a "taking" of the land, and then continued: "We need not decide whether repeated
trespasses might give rise to implied contract.... If there is a taking, the claim is 'founded
upon the Constitution' and within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear and deter-
mine." Id. at 1068-9.
6. 36 STAT. 851 (1910), 40 STAT. 705 (1918), 35 U. S. C. § 68 (1940) (patent infringe-
ment); 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 742 (1940), and 43 STAT. 1112 (1925), 46 U. S. C.
§ 781 (1940) (maritime torts). See also 49 STAT. 1049 (1935), 57 STAT. 553 (1943), 28 U. S. C.
§ 250(a) (Supp. 1946), authorizing suit for damage to oyster beds from dredging operations.
7. The most comprehensive settlement statute, 42 STAT. 1066 (1922), 31 U. S. C.
§ 215 (1940), authorizes the head of each department or establishment to settle claims up to
$1,000 for property damage caused by the negligence of employees. The Postmaster Gen-
eral may settle claims not exceeding $500 for personal injuries. 42 STAT. 63 (1921), 5 U. S. C.
§ 392 (1940). The Attorney General may settle claims not in excess of $500 for damages to
persons or property caused by members of the F.B.I. 49 STAT. 1184 (1936), 31 U. S. C.
§ 224(b) (1940). Similar statutes are listed by Holtzoff in Hearings before the Serate Com.-
mittee on the Judiciary on S. 2690, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) S. Most of these statutes are
repealed, at least in part, by the present Act, § 424(a). See discussion p. S49 el seq., infra.
8. The recent leading case is Keifer & Keifer v. RFC, 306 U. S. 381 (1939). Mr.
Justice Frankfurter there collects the corporations so empowered. Id. at 390 n. 3. Cf.
Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporations (1935) 21 VA. L. Rtv. 351,372 et seq.; (1939)
23 Am,. JuR., Foreign Corps. § 574.
9. "In each of the Seventy-fourth and Seventy-fifth Congresses over 2,300 private
claim bills were introduced, seeking more than $100,000,000. In the Seventy-slxth Congress
approximately 2,000 bills were introduced, of which 315 were approved, for a total of
$826,000." SEN. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Seas. (1946) 30. For graphic breakdown of
the 2,268 private claim bills presented in the 70th Congress, see Hcarings before the House
Committee on the Judiciary onH. R. 7236, 76th Cong., 3d Seas. (1940) 32. For collectedcriti-
cisms by congressmen of the private claim bills system see Hcarings before the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary on H. . 5373 and H. R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Ses. (1942) 49. It v.as
estimated that a measure substantially identical to the present Act would cover 40% of all
private claim bills presented to Congress, this constituting 80% of the tort claims, and 96%
of those finally approved. Id. at 13. The Legislative Reorganization Act abolishes the
Claims Committees in both Houses of Congress, assigning such of their duties as survive to
the Judiciary Committees. Pub. L. No. 601 op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 102 (1)(k), 121 (b)(1)(e).
10. The legislative history of the Federal Tort Claims Act is summarized in Report of
the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress to Accompany S. 2177, SEN. R P. No.
1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) 30. A measure with the same general purposes as the
present Act passed the 70th Congress, but encountered President Coolidge's pocket veto.
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The statute is a general waiver of governmental immunity in tort, limited
only by enumerated exceptions." It grants to the federal district courts,
sitting without a jury and subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,"
exclusive original jurisdiction over all money claims, in whatever amount,
for property damage or personal injury caused by the negligent or wrongful
act of a Government employee within the scope of his employment." Appeal
lies either to the Circuit Courts of Appeals or, with the consent of all ap-
pellees, to the Court of Claims.' 4 In addition to this judicial remedy, the
head of every Federal agency is empowered to settle any claim not in excess
of $1,000.15 Such administrative award shall be conclusive on all officers
of the Government, unless fraudulently procured; 16 but any dissatisfied
claimant may refuse the compensation and commence suit in the appropriate
district court.'
The Act provides that the law of the place of the tort shall govern in all
cases. The United States is to be liable "in the same manner, and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." is
Unsuccessful attempts to revive the measure were made in the 71st and 72nd Congresses.
Borchard, The Federal Tort Claims Bill (1933) 1 U. OF Cm. L. REV. 1. Twin bills, H. R.
7236 and S. 2690, were introduced before the 76th Congress in 1940. In many respects iden-
tical to the present act, H. R. 7236 was reported favorably by the House Committee on the
Judiciary, H. R. REs. No. 2428, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940), and passed the House; but
after hearings, the Senate Judiciary Committee did not report S. 2690, and the measure
died. The bills are reprinted in the reports of the committee hearings. See Note (1940) 50
YALE L. J. 328. In the 77th Congress, the Senate passed S. 2221; see SEN. REP. No. 1196,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1941), 88 CONG. REc. 3174 (1942) (measure printed). The House
Committee on the Judiciary, after hearings on similar measures of its own, H. R. 5373 and
H. R. 6463, (bills printed in report of the hearings) reported the Senate measure favorably,
with amendments, H. R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); but it was not con-
sidered by the House before the end of the session. As thus amended S. 2221 is a virtual
duplicate of the Act finally passed. Because of this close similarity, the committee hearings
and reports on the 1940 and 1942 measures are invaluable source material in analyzing the
present Act, especially since the hearings and reports on the 1946 Act are extremely sketchy.
This is probably due to the thorough consideration given the 1940 and 1942 measures, and
the concentration of the committee on other phases of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1946, in which the Federal Tort Claims Act is incorporated. See note 1, supra.
11. The exceptions are discussed in detail infra p. 542 el seg. Briefly, jurisdiction is
denied over claims based on an act done pursuant to a statute or regulation, whether or not
valid; one done in the exercise of discretion; or while exercising such governmental functions
as regulation of the monetary system or the quarantine service; or one of a class as to which
satisfactory provision has already been made, such as maritime torts; or on certain causes of
action, such as malicious prosecution, slander, and assault. See F. T. C. A. § 421.
12. F.T.C.A. § 411.
13. F.T.C.A. § 410(a).
14. F.T.C.A. § 412(a).
15. F.T.C.A. § 403(a).
16. F. T. C. A. § 403(b).
17. F.T.C.A. § 420.
18. F.T. C.A. § 410(a).
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SCOPE OF THE ACT
Supreme Court interpretation of statutes waiving governmental immunity
from suit has followed two distinct and conflicting trends. The older but
still active doctrine is that Congress will not be presumed to have made such
waiver, and therefore all statutes purporting to do so will be strictly con-
strued.' 9 On the other hand the Court has found that dominant contem-
porary opinion approves increased relaxations of the immunity and, by
imputing that view to Congressional intent, has resolved doubtful points of
interpretation against the Government or its agenciesPco This change in
attitude has been reflected in the decisions of the lower federal courts.2
The final scope of the Tort Claims Act will at many points necessarily depend
upon which of these approaches is taken by the courts.
The Jurisdictional Grant. The Act gives authority to the head of every
Federal agency to settle claims not exceeding $1,000, and vests exclusive
jurisdiction in the Federal district courts to hear:
".. . any claim against the United States, for money only . . .on
account of damage to or loss of property or on account of personal
injury or death .. . caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within
the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where
the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claim-
ant for such damage, loss, injury or death in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 22
Jurisdiction in a given case will depend upon the construction of the phrases
"employee of the Government," "Federal agency," "scope of his office or
employment," and "negligent or wrongful act or omission," and upon
whether the alleged delict falls within one of the enumerated exceptions. 2 3
19. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 590 (1941); United States v. Michel, 282
U.S. 656,659 (1931); Eastern Transp. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 675, 6S6 (1927).
20. Keifer & Keifer v. RFC, 306 U. S. 381, 391 (1939); F. H. A. v. Burr, 309 U. S.
242, 245 (1940); United States v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495, 501 (1940), Canadian Aviator Ltd. v.
United States, 324 U. S. 215, 222 (1945) semble.
21. Dollar v. Land, 154 F. (2d) 307, 312 (App. D. C. 1946); RFC v. J. G. Menihan.
Corp., 111 F. (2d) 940, 941 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940); Walling v. McCracken County Ars'n, 50 F.
Supp. 900,906 (W. D. Ky. 1943).
22. F. T. C. A. §§ 403(a), 410(a). The phraseology conferring authority upon the
heads of agencies is identical with that applicable to district courts, save that the former is
restricted by a clause reading: "where the total amount of the claim does not exceed $1,000."
No upper or lower jurisdictional amount limits the Federal district courts. A lower limit
was discarded in the expectation that most of the smaller claims would be settled by the
administrative procedure, and on the theory that every claimant should have his day in
court. See Hearings before the Senate Conmmittee on the Judiciary on S. 690, 76th Cong., 3d
Sess. (1940) 43. One of the first complaints to be filed under the Act seeks to recover $175,000
for the death of claimant's husband from injuries received on July 28, 1945, when a Mitchell
bomber crashed into the Empire State Building. N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1946, p. 15, col. 3.
23. Since the jurisdiction granted courts and administrative agencies is identical rave
for the thousand-dollar clause, the problem of jurisdiction will be considered only from the
point of view of the courts.
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"Employee of the Government" is defined in the Act as including:
".. . officers or employees of any Federal agency, members of the
military or naval forces of the United States, and persons acting on
behalf of a Federal agency in an official capacity, temporarily or
permanently in the service of the United States, whether with or
without compensation." 24
Congressional committee hearings on earlier bills indicate that the broad
language of this section is intended to be liberally construed. They em-
phasize that the determining fact will be not the individual's primary em-
ployment, but the nature of the enterprise in which he was engaged at the
time of the tort.
2
"Federal agency" is defined in the Act as including:
".. . the executive departments and independent establishments
of the United States, and corporations whose primary function is
to act as, and while acting as, instrumentalities or agencies of the
United States, whether or not authorized to sue and be sued in
tfieir own names: Provided, That this shall not be construed to in-
clude any contractor with the United States." 21
When a corporation is acting as an agency or instrumentality of the United
States, or when one is a contractor with the United States, is determinable
only in the framework of specific situations. The nature" and consequent
privileges of quasi-governmental corporations have been variously con-
strued for different purposes. The Supreme Court has in this connection
weighed the nature of the activity performed, 27 the fact that a corporation
was created by Congress,2s the ownership of corporate stock," and the na-
24. F. T. C. A. § 402(b).
25. See Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 5373 and H. R.
6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 16. The Committee considered the definition so broad
that they felt it necessary, in 1942, explicitly to exclude the thousands of volunteer workers
then connected with the Office of Civilian Defense. H. R. Rui'. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1942) 1, 11.
26. F.T.C.A. § 402(a).
27. Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 522 (1926). The governmental-propri-
etary distinction is still widely observed in the field of municipal tort liability. See Fuller
and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation (1941) 54 HARV. L. REV. 437, 441-3;
Hobbs, The Tort Liability of Municipalities (1940) 27 VA. L. REv. 126. Cf. Graves v. New
York, 306 U. S. 466 (1939), in which the Court virtually abolishes the distinction for pur-
poses of taxation.
28. Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. McCarl, 275 U. S. 1 (1927). Mr. Justice Brandeis here
terms the Emergency Fleet Corporation, for purposes of the jurisdiction of the Comptroller
General over its accounting, an "instrumentality" of the Government. Id. at 5. In a later
case reported in the same volume he identifies the same corporation as a "department" of the
Government for purposes of the Post Roads Act, differentiating it from other corporations
which are merely "instrumentalities." Emerg. Fleet Corp. v. Western Union, 275 U. S.
415,426 (1928).
29. Bank of the United States v. Planters Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat. 904, 907 (U. S.
1824); Capitol Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Kansas Commission of Labor and Industry, 148 Kan.
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ture of powers conferred as distinct from those actually exercised.3' ' More-
over, a corporation's primary function is not alone controlling; it must in
fact be acting as an instrumentality or agency of the United States when
committing the tort complained ofA1
It is perhaps inevitable that there should be here renewed the time-honored
distinction between governmental and proprietary functions.- However, in
order to achieve the aims of this Act the definition of Federal agency should
be held to include at least any corporation which would have shared the
governmental immunity in the absence of Congressional waiver.
These distinctions confront claimants with a ticklish problem. Since
joinder of parties is not allowed in suits brought under the Act, 3 it will be
necessary in each case to decide whether to sue the agency in its own name
or to sue the United States, and if the court holds that claimant elected the
wrong remedy, he will not only have wasted much time and effort but may
also have lost his cause of action due to the operation of the statute of limita-
tions. Courts and claimants alike must be careful to prevent this distinction
from becoming extremely burdensome. 4
"Scope of his office or employment" is defined in the Act only to the extent
that when applied to members of the armed forces it shall be interpreted to
mean "in line of duty." " Courts have interpreted "in line of duty" var-
iously, depending upon the issue involved; 0 when used in connection with
military personnel it has generally been broadly construed so as to cover
446, 83 P. (2d) 106 (1938). Cf. Gully v. First Nat. Bank, 299 U. S. 109, 113 (1936): "Federal
incorporation is now abolished as a ground of federal jurisdiction except where the United
States holds more than one-half the stock. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, c. 299, § 12, 43 Stat. 936,
941."
30. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U. S. 180, 210 (1921). Cf. Fed. Land
Bank of St. Louis v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229, 231 (1935).
31. The draftsmen presumably foresaw the possibility that a corporation whose primary
function is that of an instrumentality of the United States might engage in other activities
of a private nature, for which the United States should not be liable. This seems to be the
most probable explanation for the phrase "and while acting as." See text accompanying
note 26 supra.
32. See authorities cited note 27 supra.
33. See discussion infra, pp. 554-5.
34. A similar situation arose in Davis v. Dept. of Labor and Industries of the State of
Washington, 317 U. S. 249, 254 (1942). To avoid "the horns of the jurisdictional dilemma"
the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Black, in effect held that, in the "twilight zone," it
would permit an overlap of jurisdictions which in theory are mutually exclusive. Id. at 256.
Mr. Chief Justice Stone, dissenting, said that such a solution "can hardly be deemed to be
within judicial competence." Id. at 260. Cf. Hust v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 66 Sup.
Ct. 1218,1225 (U. S. 1946).
35. F. T. C. A. § 402(c). As to other personnel the phrase will be interpreted in accord-
ance with local state law, and raises no problems peculiar to this statute.
36. See 32 Oss. ATT'Y. GENL. 12 (1922) (discusses the meaning of the phrase for pur-
poses of the War Risk Insurance Act of 1919, giving complete historical survey). Cf. Collins
v. Dollar S. S. Lines, 23 F. Supp. 395 (S. D. N. Y. 1938); Doke v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 15
Wash. (2d) 536, 131 P. (2d) 436 (1942); RoWiNsoN, AmiLALTY (1939) 293-4.
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many of the ordinary activities of life not usually included within the mean-
ing of "scope of employment." 11 Army Regulations and the decisions of the
Judge Advocate General also adopt a broad meaning for the phrase.3 8 Since
the Army uses it most frequently in cases inv6lving recovery by the military
personnel responsible for the act in question, as in cases involving the settle-
ment of active duty pay accounts or the disposition of claims for death
gratuity, there is a strong tendency to make "in line of duty" synonymous
with "not due to own misconduct." 39 In cases under this Act, where the
issue will be recovery by a third person for acts of the military personnel, the
phrase "in line of duty" may well be extended even further than has been
done by the Army, with the concept of misconduct relegated to a less im-
portant position. Since the existing law for settling domestic claims arising
out of the activities of the armed forces 40 uses the "scope of erfiployment"
phrase, Congress presumably inserted the "in line of duty" definition in
order to achieve a broader coverage for this Act.41
Determination of what constitutes "negligent or wrongful act or omission"
may entangle unwary claimants in intricate legal snarls. While the phrase is
susceptible of a very broad construction,'42 its normal meaning when used in
similar contexts does not extend to causes of action based purely on con-
tract, and it is clear from a reading of the statute and committee reports that
Congress used it in this normal sense. 43 Since the right to sue on claims "not
sounding in tort" was granted by the Tucker Act,44 which prescribes a
procedure different from that applicable under this statute,45 it is possible
that the common law forms of action will continue to haunt the Federal
courts as they unravel the problems of jurisdiction thus presented.
37. Moore v. United States, 48 Ct. Cl. 110 (1913) (death while returning to duty caused
by disease presumably contracted while on leave of absence); Malone v. State Life Ins. Co.,
202 Mo. App. 499, 508, 213 S. W. 877, 880 (1919) ("in line of duty" said to mean only "not
violating any military law," and death occurring while "in line of duty" means only "while
in military service").
38. See Amiy REG. 40-1025 (63) (1944), interpreted in BULL. JAG, Part II, AR-345.
See also DIG. Op. JAG, 1912-1940 (1942) 952-3.
39. Ibid.
40. 57 STAT. 372 (1943), 59 STAT. 225 (1945), 31 U. S. C. § 223(b) (Supp. 1946) au-
thorizes the Secretary of War to settle claims arising out of negligent acts of members of the
armed forces or employees of the War Department while acting within the scope of their
employment. See Notes (1946) 31 CoRN. L. Q. 408, (1943) 53 YALE L. J. 188.
41. No discussion of the phrase has been found in any of the committee hearings or
reports.
42. The word "wrongful" is subject to various interpretations. Thus moral wrongs
must be distinguished from those merely legal, and the latter category further subdivided
into wrongs ex contractu and those ex delicto. See 1 COOLEY, ToRTs (4th ed. 1932) § 2.
43. See Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2690, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1940) 43-4.
44. See notes 4 and 5 supra.
45. Under the Tucker Act claims for over $10,000 must be brought in the Court of
Claims, those under $10,000 in either the Court of Claims or the Federal district courts. 24
STAT. 505 (1887), 28 U. S. C. §§ 41 (20), 250 (1940). Judgments of the Court of Claims are
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The Supreme Court has been careful to preserve the distinction between
tort and contract, so long as immunity of the Government depended upon
that distinction.46 It has repeatedly denied the privilege, sometimes ac-
corded at common law, of waiving the tort and suing on contract on the
grounds that this would extend the liability of the Government beyond the
Congressional intent.47 But if the distinction is retained after the passage of
this statute, the issue will be not whether claimant may maintain his suit but
in which court he should bring it.41 It is to be hoped that in this situation the
Court will not make a stumbling block of the distinction and will allow
plaintiff his choice of jurisdictions whenever grounds can be found for do-
ing so.
Precedent for disregarding the distinction between tort and contract may
be found in cases involving Federal agencies authorized to sue and be sued
in their own names. In the case of Keifer & Keifer v. R.F. C.,49 based on the
negligence of a Federal agency under a contract of bailment, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, writing for a unanimous Court, labels the distinction a "proce-
dural entanglement." ' Without deciding whether the action sounded in
tort or contract, the decision upholds the jurisdiction of the lower court
pursuant to the statutory authorization of suit against the agency. The
opinion emphasizes that where the waiver of immunity is not limited specif-
ically to "tort" or "contract," the distinction in border-line cases is not
important. 5' The word "tort" occurs in the Tort Claims Act only in the
title, with actionable delicts defined rather as "negligent or wrongful acts or
omissions." This studious avoidance of the term which would most surely
earmark the old forms of action, taken in conjunction with the Keifer &
Keifer case, is an indication that ancient formalism may be minimized in
litigation under the new Act.52
subject to review by the Supreme Court, 43 STAT. 939 (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 288 (1940);
judgments of the Federal district courts are reviewable by the circuit courts of appeals like
other judgments of the district courts, 43 STAT. 939 (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 226 (1940).
46. The preservation of this distinction has at times been only verbal, for in many cases
involving a trespass or conversion the Court has found a "taking" and therefrom an implied
contract. See cases cited infra note 53; Note (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 674.
47. United States v. Jones, 131 U. S. 1 (1889); Hill v. United States, 149 U. S. 593
(1893); Harley v. United States, 198 U. S. 229 (1905). Cf. Keifer & Keifer v. RFC, 306
U. S. 381, 394-6 (1939); United States v. Causby, 66 Sup. Ct. 1062 (U. S. 1946); United
Australia Ltd. v. Barclays Bank, Ltd. [1939] 1 All E. R. 676. See 1 COOLEY, ToTLs § 61;
Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit (1910) 19 YALE L. J. 221; Notes (1934) 43
YALE L. J. 674, (1925) 38 HARv. L. REv. 1104.
48. Seenote45supra.
49. 306 U.S. 381 (1939).
50. Id. at 395. "But where the wrong really derives from an undertaking, to stand on
the undertaking and to disregard the tort is not to invoke a fictive agreement. It merely
recognizes a choice of procedural vindications open to the injured party." Ibid.
51. Id.at395-6.
52. If this course is followed in the construction of the new Act, it may also be as-
similated into the construction of the Tucker Act, even though this would now involve a
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A separate problem is raised in the field of implied contracts. When by
trespass or conversion the Government has interfered with property rights,
the Supreme Court has been generous in finding a "taking" and a consequent
implied contract to reimburse. 3 Now that actions, in tort may be main-
tained, the Court may change its policy and restrict its construction of "tak-
ing" in cases under the Tucker Act. However, since the vast majority of the
trespass and conversion cases will fall within the terms of the exceptions to
the Tort Claims Act,5 4 curtailment of the Tucker Act's coverage would
deprive many claimants of any judicial or administrative remedy.
Another question, open to fine-spun legal argument supporting any de-
sired conclusion, is whether the word "wrongful" should be interpreted to
include those activities which in some jurisdictions impose liability without
fault.55 The obvious effort of Congress, by the sweeping terms of the Act,
is to place the Government in the position of a private corporation in respect
to suits in tort, limited only by the carefully worded exceptions. The Act
states forthrightly that the United States shall be liable where ". . . a
private person would be liable . . . in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred." 16 This overall intent militates strongly
against an unnecessarily restrictive construction of the words used in es-
tablishing the broad basis of the Goverment's liability, and suggests inter-
preting "negligent or wrongful act or omission" as including all causes of
action which would lie in tort against a private litigant."
The Exceptions. With whatever liberality the courts may interpret the
waiver of immunity thus broadly defined in the first parts of the Act, the
position of the Government is carefully protected by twelve specific excep-
clear reversal of policy by the Court. For evidence of a recent change in direction in regard
to the Tucker Act see United States v. Causby, 66 Sup. Ct. 1062 (U. S. 1946), discussed
supra note 5.
53. Portsmouth Harbor Land and Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 327 (1922);
United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445 (1903). Cf. United States v. Causby, 66 Sup. Ct. 1062
(U. S. 1946). See cases collected and discussion in Notes (1934) 43 Y~A. L. J. 674, (1925)
38 HARv. L. REV. 1104.
54. The first exception, discussed infra p. 543 et seq., denies jurisdiction over claims
based on acts done pursuant to statute or regulation, or those based on the exercise of a
discretionary function. Most of the cases arise out of flood-control or navigation-improve-
ment projects, and would probably be held excluded by the first clause of the exception.
See note 62 infra.
55. For argument to the effect that a wrong is only the breach of a duty owed, and that
the action must itself be such a breach if the actor is to be liable for consequent injuries, see
1 COOLEY, TORTS, §§ 3, 56. From this it may be said to follow that where the law imposes
absolute liability for the damaging results of acts not in themselves objectionable, the acts
themselves are nevertheless not breaches of duty and therefore not "wrongful." But cf.
Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952 (1928); PROSSER, TORTS
(1941) 429; Harris, Liability Without Fault (1932) 6 TULANE L. REv. 337.
56. F.T.C.A.§410(a).
57. Little attention is given to the scope of the phrase in committee hearings, But see
Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2690, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940)
43-4.
(Vol. 56:' 534
THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
tions.5s Each of these must seek its justification in some practical necessity,
for the Act is in itself a denial of the validity of conceptualistic sovereign
immunity.59
The first exception, which is at once the most sweeping and the least
definite, denies jurisdiction to the courts to consider:
"Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or
based upon the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a Federal
agency or employee of the Government, whether or not the discre-
tion involved be abused." Go
The first half of this exception limits the scope of the word "wrongful" by
excepting torts, not negligent, which have been "legalized" by statute or
regulation, thus giving to the Government a free hand in pursuing any
authorized activity without threat of liability. The scope of the exception
will depend primarily upon the interpretation of the phrase "in the execu-
tion of a statute or regulation." How remote need an activity be from the
direct and immediate command of a statute before it can no longer be said
to be done in execution thereof? 61 Reference to the committee hearings and
reports on the bill indicates that the legislators intended a construction nar-
rowing the exception. 62
That the courts would probably have read such an exception into the
Act even weie it not expressly set forth was recognized by its proponents. 3
To hold the Government liable to damage suits for any of its normal and
authorized activities would be intolerably burdensome. The Government
58. F.T.C.A. § 421.
59. Cf. Block, Suits Against Gorernment Officers and the Sorereign Immunity Doctrine
(1946) 59 -ARv. L. REv. 1060, 1061.
60. F.T.C.A. § 421(a).
61. Analogous problems of statutory construction arise in cases seeking mandamus
against public officers, Wilbur v. United States ex rd. Kadrie, 281 U. S. 206 (1930), Work v.
United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U. S. 175 (1925); and in cases seeking to hold public officers
liable for breach of statutory duties, Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605 (1912);
Burns v. Moragne, 128 Ala. 493, 29 So. 460 (1901).
62. For the most complete development of the intended function of this all-important
exception see H. R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 10. And see Hearings before
the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sss.
(1942) 33, 44. The reason for the rule suggests a possible criterion for interpreting it: the
act complained of, in order to come under the cloak of the exception, must have been one of
the consequences intended by Congress or the regulatory agency. Thus a trespass com-
mitted by the occasional flooding of plaintiff's land by a floo& control project (where in-
sufficient to constitute a "taking") would fall within the exception, but not an unnecessary
trespass by Government employees engaged in working on the project, even though they
were acting, in one sense, "pursuant to the statute."
63. See Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 5373 and H. R.
6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 29.
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could not defend all suits arising out of the old NRA, for example, or that
might be brought under an OPA regulation, both because of the multiplic-
ity of suits and the impossibility of estimating damages." Moreover, as one
of the major functions of the Government is to regulate and modify the
rights and duties of its citizens, there must of necessity be an incidental
surrender of some private rights to promote an orderly and predictable ad-
ministration. 65 If an individual feels himself, unduly imposed upon by such
governmental activity, his remedy lies in whatever appellate authority there
may be, and thereafter to the ballot box. 6 In any event, the Act does not
leave claimants entirely remediless, for claims not cognizable under its terms
may still be presented to Congress, 7 and the liability of individual officers
for exceeding or abusing their authority has not been modified. 8
The second clause of the exception denies jurisdiction to the courts over
claims based on the exercise of a discretionary function, whether or not negli-
64. A suit by a landlord for damages under an OPA regulation imposing a ceiling on
rents would, if allowed, introduce for judicial determination the question of how much
overall benefit the claimant had received from the statute, and what part the statute played
in retarding or preventing inflation. Likewise, under the NRA, the possible stimulus which
was given to business generally would have to be weighed against the immediate local
damage caused by any given restriction.
65. Compare Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.'S. 47, 53-4 (1944), with
Ainsworth v. Barn Ballroom Co., 157 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A. 4th, 1946).
66. In many cases, a convenient example being an OPA regulation, the fact that the
question is political rather than legal is another reason for denying jurisdiction to tle courts
in an action for damages. Under the provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act it is
improbable that any action for damages caused by an OPA regulation could have been
maintained even were this exception omitted from the Tort Claims Act. Judicial considera-
tion of the regulations is expressly limited to a hearing before the Administrator, with ap-
peal to the United States Emergency Court of Appeals and review by the Supreme Court.
56 STAT. 31 (1942), 58 STAT. 638 (1944), 50 U. S. C., App. §§ 923, 924 (Supp. 1946). This
procedure is discussed at length and approved in Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414
(1944).
67. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, op. cit. supra n. 1, § 131. The bill, S. 2177,
as it passed the Senate, provided that no private bill presenting a claim for damages could
be considered. The House substitute measure inserted the words "for which suit may be
instituted under the Federal Tort Claims Act." In debate on the floor of the House Mr.
Monroney, vice-chairman of the committee which presented the bill, said: ". . . there will
be no claims blocked. Either they lave a right to come ...before the Congress or they
can go into the courts." 92 Cong. Rec., July 25, 1946 at 10091.
Thus a riparian owner whose lands have been incidentally harmed by an authorized
flood control project, but who cannot show sufficient damage to justify eminent domain pro-
ceedings or to prove a "taking" for purposes of recovery under the Tucker Act, text and
authorities note 53 supra, will be relegated to a private claim bill.
68. -When an agent of the Government acts beyond his actual authority, or pursuant to
an unconstitutional statute, he is often held personally liable, although no recourse is avail-
able against the Government. See 2 COOLEY, TORTS c. 13-4; MEcHEM, PUBLIC OFFICERS
(1890) Bk. IV; Keefe, Personal Tort Liability of Administrative Officials (1943) 12 FORDEAM
L. REV. 130; Block, supra note 59, at 1060. See also Yearsley v. Ross Const. Co., 309 U. S.
18 (1940), 38 MIcH. L. REv. 1344; Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F. (2d) 557
(App. D. C. 1934).
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gence is shown or the discretion abused. The immunity thus retained is in
accord with the generally accepted doctrine of the non-liability of public
officers for acts involving the exercise of judgment and discretion~C It is
justified because of the danger to independent and fearless action by dis-
cretionary agents which would result from the threat of actions in tort. The
interests of orderly administration and freedom of action by the Govern-
ment demand that the charge of a negligent or abusive use of discretion in
the form of an action for damages be not available to any individual desirous
of hampering the functioning of an agency. The citizen's remedy must lie
in other directions."0
There is nothing in the Act to indicate that the criteria for distinguishing a
discretionary from a ministerial function shall differ from that employed in
other contexts, as where the issue is municipal liability in tort,71 personal
liability of a government officer,7 2 or availability of injunction against gov-
ernmental agencies.7
3
Closely related to this general immunity for official acts are four specific
exceptions which provide that the jurisdiction of the courts shall not extend
to: "any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission
of letters or postal matter;" 74 "any claim arising out of an act or omission of
any employee of the Government in administering the provisions of the
Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended;" -5 "any claim for damages
caused by the imposition or establishment of a quarantine by the United
States;" 7 and "any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operation of the
Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system." These provisions
extend beyond the first exception because, having no qualifying phrases,
69. See cases and texts cited note 72 infra.
70. If the action of the Federal agent is unconstitutional or beyond his authority,
claimant can often hold the agent individually liable. See note 68 stpra. But if not, and
claimant merely objects to the exercise of discretion, his only recourse is removal of the
offending official, either through political action or, possibly, impeachment. See Dakota
Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota ex rel. Payne, 250 U. S. 163,184 (1919).
71. Harris v. District of Columbia, 256 U. S. 650 (1921); Green v. City of Mechanic-
ville, 269 N. Y. 117, 199 N. E. 26 (1935). See Borchard, Gorernment Liability in Tort (1924)
34 YALE L. J. 129, 133, 135; cases collected (1941) 38 Au. JUR., Mfunicipal Corporations
§ 578.
72. Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 541 (1918); Roberts v. United States, 176 U.S. 221,
230-1 (1900); Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F. (2d) 557 (App. D. C. 1934). See
2 COOLEY, TORTS § 297; Keefe, Personal Tort Liability of AdministraLire Officials (1943)
12 FOR .2 L. REv. 130, 134 et seq. The cases are collected in (1942) 43 .A-. Jim., Public
Officers §§ 278-9.
73. Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U. S. 627, 633 (1914) (mandamus); IV. U. Tel. Co. v. Tax
Commission of Ohio, 21 F. (2d) 355, 361 (S. D. Ohio 1927) (injunction).
74. F.T. C.A. § 421(b).
75. F. T. C. A. § 421(e). See 40 STAT. 415 (1917), 40 STAT. 966 (1918), 48 STAT. 1
(1933), 54 STAT. 179 (1940), 12 U. S. C. § 95a (1940), 55 STAT. 839 (1941), 12 U. S. C. § 95a
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they cover even gross negligence in performing a ministerial duty.78 How-
ever, the provisions are carefully worded in the attempt not to include the
ordinary common-law torts of negligence of employees of those agencies,
disassociated from their primary purposes. In hearings and committee re-
ports this point is frequently stressed.
79
These four exceptions reveal an abundance of caution on the part of Con-
gress in relaxing the Government's immunity. They exclude liability for
damages caused not by the adoption of a policy or the exercise of discretion
but rather by negligence within the agencies concerned. As regards the
monetary system the draftsmen presumably felt that the liability would be
too immense and the damages too widespread to justify any allowance of
claims.80 As regards the Trading with the Enemy Act, a probable con-
tributing factor, though not mentioned in hearings or reports, was the
diplomatic and military undesirability of authorizing trials in open court.
The postal exception is based on the number of cases which might arise were.
it not included.8 ' No satisfactory explanation for the quarantine provision
has been given. It was once described as "dangerous," 8 2 which presumably
means that if it were not included, some large judgments might be recovered.
If, however, a private person has been greatly damaged by the unnecessary
imposition of a quarantine, not due to a mistaken use of discretion by some
78. Even in the absence of these specific exceptions, the activities concerned would not
impose liability on the Government for statutory wrongs or for the negligent performance
of a discretionary duty, under the first exception. Note 60 supra.
79. See, e.g., H. R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 10: "However, tile
common-law torts of employees of regulatory agencies would be included within the scope
of the bill .... Thus, [the sections] exempting claims arising from the administration of
the Trading With the Enemy Act or the fiscal operations of the Treasury, are not intended
to exclude such common-law torts as an automobile collision caused by the negligence of an
employee of the Treasury Department or other Federal agency administering those func-
tions." And see Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 5373 and
H. R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942)-33.
80. The explanations given for these provisions are often ambiguous or inconclusive.
Thus the treasury exception was explained on the basis that it seemed "proper and desirable
to the framers of the bill." Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2590,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 39. And again: "The other exemptions . . relate to certain
governmental activities which should be free from the threat of damage suits ... ." H. R.
REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 10.
81. An additional reason advanced for this exception is the ease with which postal
matter may be insured. Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. Z690,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 38. For a discussion of the personal liability of postmasters see
2 COOLEY, TORTS § 305.
82. Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 260, 76th Cong., 3d
Sess. (1940) 38. Since the exception applies only to the imposition of a quarantine, by which
only a limited number of parties would be damaged, the danger does not appear to be
multiplicity of suits. If, due to negligence in some ministerial capacity, a quarantine were
not imposed and an epidemic thereby started, the exception does not apply. However, in
such a case, the duty owed by the Government being only to the public in general, no in-
individual would have standing to sue. Cf. 1 COOLEY, TORTS § 59; 2 id. § 301, and cases
cited.
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officer but simply to negligence within the department, it seems that the
general public in whose interest the quarantine was imposed should bear the
loss, rather than the blameless individual upon whom it fell.
The same observations apply in large part to another exception, which
denies jurisdiction to the courts over "any claim arising out of assault,
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosection, abuse of
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with con-
tract rights." S3 The reason for including this exception, as explained in
committee hearings of an earlier act, is the difficulty of defending such suits
and the probability of judgments against the Government in amounts out
of proportion to the damages actually suffered by claimants. 4 The reason
seems insufficient to warrant complete denial of jurisdiction to the courts.
If it seemed desirable to exclude recovery for mental suffering or other par-
ticular phases of liability, that could be accomplished by specific provision.
But this sweeping exception imposes a hardship upon claimants and leaves
open one fruitful source of private claim bills.8 5
Another group of exceptions is included because of satisfactory provisions
already made for handling the claims covered. This group includes the col-
lection of taxes and customs duties,86 maritime torts,67 injury to vessels or
their cargo, crew or passengers while in the Panama Canal,s" and the ac-
tivities of the TVA.P9 The exception relating to taxes and customs should,
like the exceptions covering negligence in certain departments, discussed
above, be interpreted as not including ordinary torts, disassociated from the
83. F.T.C.A. §421(h).
84. The proponents of an earlier bill seemed to fear the inflammatory nature of some of
the torts here excluded, such as possible third degree beatings by the FBI. See Hearings
before the Senate Committee on the 1udiciary on S. 260, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 39. The
fact that all cases will be tried without a jury detracts much from the weight of this argu-
ment.
85. Cf. letter from the Federal Bar Association of New York, New Jersey, and Con-
necticut, id. at 14.
86. F. T. C. A. § 421(c). The Tax Court of the United States has jurisdiction over
claims for rebate of taxes. 53 STAT. 158 (1939), 56 STAT. 957 (1942), 26 U. S. C. § 1100
et seg. (1940 and Supp. 1946). Claims arising out of the payment of customs duties are
heard by the United States Customs Court, with review by the United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, 44 STAT. 669 (1926), 54 STAT. 1101 (1940), 28 U.S. C. §§ 296-7
(1940); 36 STAT. 1143 (1911), as amended, 28 U. S. C. §§ 301-12 (1940). Cf. Riccomini v.
United States, 69 F. (2d) 480 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934).
87. F. T. C. A. § 421(d). See Canadian Aviator Ltd. v. United States, 324 U. S. 215
(1945) for a review of the legislation permitting suit against the Government in admiralty,
the Acts of 1920 and 1925, loc. cit. supra note 6. See Zeller Marine Corp. v. United States,
66 F. Supp. 447 (S. D. N. Y. 1946), and cases cited, for some of the difficulties of correlating
the statutes with the Tucker Act, loc. cit. supra note 4.
88. F. T. C, A. § 421(g). The handling of claims arising out of the operation of the
Panama Canal are discussed by Burdick in Hearings before the House Commaitee on the Judi-
ciary onH. 1L 7236, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 26-30.
89. F.T.C.A.§421(l).
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direct administration of duties involved." The exception relating to the
TVA was at no time discussed in hearings or reports. 1 The unqualified terms
apply to all activities of TVA employees, so that claimants are relegated to
the statute authorizing the Authority to sue and be sued in its own name."
That authorization has been interpreted as limiting the right of suit in tort
to cases in which the alleged delict was not a duly authorized activity of the
Authority, thus imposing much the same restriction as that found in the
first exception of this statute.93
Of the two remaining exceptions, one covers "any claim arising in a foreign
country." 14 This is a desirable corollary to the provision that the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred shall govern, to avoid the difficulties
inherent in administering foreign law.95 The other excepts "any claim arising
out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast
Guard, during time of war." N A similarly worded exception is found in the
acts authorizing the Secretary of War to settle claims arising out of the ac-
tivities of our armed forces.9 7 Since this Act to some extent replaces and en-
larges those measures, 8 and since the meaning of "combatant activity" has
apparently not been litigated in the courts, it may be assumed that Con-
gress 11 intended the phrase as construed in administrative interpretations.
90. See note 79 supra. Thus a customs official who through negligence mistakenly
thought a bottle to contain contraband and smashed it, would thereby impose no liability
upon the Government under this Act. But if in so doing he negligently hurt a bystander,
this exception would not deny jurisdiction to the courts in an action by the bystander against
the United States. -
91. The exception appeared once before, in the version of the 1942 measure reported by
the House Committee on the Judiciary. No explanation for it was given. H. R. Rur. 2245,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 4, 12. It was introduced into this Act in the House substitute
version of the Senate measure. 92 Cong. Rec., July 25, 1946, at 10106,10143.
92. 48STAT.58(1933),16U.S.C.§ 831 (1940).
93. Lynn v. United States, 110 F. (2d) 586 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940); Grant v. TVA, 49 F.
Supp. 564 (E. D. Tenn. 1942). Cf. Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporations (1935)
21 VA. L. Rv. 351,372 et seq.; Notes (1941) 10 U. KAN. CiTY L. REv. 65, (1940) 125 A. L, R.
809, 814 (as to HOLC). See infra note 110.
94. F.T.C.A. § 421(k).
95. See Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 5373 and 1-. R.
6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 35.
96. F.T.C.A. §421(j).
97. 57 STAT. 372 (1943), 59 STAT. 225 (1945), 31 U. S. C. § 223(b) (Supp. 1946) (covers
only claims not arising in a foreign country and "incident to noncombat activities"); 55
STAT. 880 (1942), 57 STAT. 66 (1943), 31 U. S. C. § 224(d) (Supp. 1946) (applies only to
foreign claims and expressly excludes "any act by our armed forces engaged in combat").
98. F. T. C. A. § 424(a). Since all foreign claims are excluded from the operation of this
act, the Foreign Claims Act, supra note 97, is believed to be unaffected. See discussion infra
p. 549 et seq., and note 113.
99. The word "combatant" was inserted into § 421(j) by committee amendment on the
floor of the House, without discussion. 92 Cong. Rec., July 25, 1946, at 10143. Hence, no
explanation of the intended scope of the term is to be found in committee hearings or re-
ports. The amendment may have been inserted in view of the uncertain meaning of the
companion phrase "during time of war." See note 102 infra. Cf. Hearings before the House
Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 12.
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Both in Army Regulations 101 and in the decisions of the Judge Advocate
General of the Army,1 ' "combatant activity" has been given a very re-
stricted meaning. Thus no practice or training maneuvers are included, nor
are operations not directly connected with engaging the enemy. The mean-
ing of "during time of war" varies with its context. It is generally con-
strued as extending to the signing of the peace treaties, but is sometimes
interpreted as terminating with active hostilities.10 2 Since only combatant
activites are excepted under the instant Act, and since in any event no claim
arising in a foreign country will be considered, the meaning of "during time
of war" is an academic question, at least for the present.
Absent from this Act is the exception, included in earlier bills, which cov-
ered any claim which was within the terms of the Federal Employees' Com-
pensation Act. 0 3 In the hearings on former bills there was adverse criticism
of limiting an employee's rights to the Compensation Act,10 4 and its omission
now leaves a choice of remedies. 0 5 However, if an employee elects to proceed
with the Compensation Commission and accepts its award, he undoubtedly
will not thereafter be permitted to move under this Act also.tS
Acts Repealed or _1odified. A final issue of jurisdiction raised by the statute
concerns its effect on previous Acts of Congress. Section 423 directs that in
respect of "claims cognizable under part 3 of this title" 107 the provisions of
100. See Amiy REG. 25-25 (9) and (15) (1945) and Army REG. 25-90 (9) and (15)
(1945).
101. See BuLL. JAG, c. 10 (1943-6).
102. 40 Ops. Ar'Y Gun. No. 100, Sept. 1, 1945; Report to the President of the Att'y
Gen., H. R. Doc. No. 282, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). Cf. Note (1946) 20 TuLA= L.
REv. 440.
103. 39 STAT. 742 (1916), 5 U. S. C. § 751 el seg. (1940).
104. All of the bills considered in committee hearings in 1940 and 1942 contained the
exception. See note 10 supra. Mr. Holtzoff, representative of the Department of Justice,
which played a large part in drafting the measures, opposed the exception as an unfair dis-
crimination against the employees affected. Hearings before Senate Committee on the Judi-
ciary on S. 2690, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 49. He testified that the provision v,.as included
because it was thought that the idea of giving a choice of remedies would be considered too
advanced. Its omission now is evidence that Congress has come abreast of the ideas then
held by the Department of Justice.
105. Dahn v. Davis, 258 U. S. 421 (1922); Panama R. R. v. Minnix, 282 Fed. 47 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1922); cf. Posey v. TVA, 93 F. (2d) 726 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937).
106. See Dahn v. Davis, 258 U. S. 421 (1922). Plaintiff, a Government railroad em-
ployee injured in the course of his employment, had standing to sue on the tort under the
Federal Control Act, 40 STAT. 451 (1918). It was held that acceptance of an award under
the Federal Employees' Compensation Act estopped him from further action against the
Government. And see Brady v. Roosevelt S. S. Co., 317 U. S. 575, 581 (1943). For an inter-
pretation which suggests the possibility of proceeding under the Tort Claims Act if an award
is refused by the Compensation Commission, see Humphrey v. Poss, 245 Ala. 11, 15 So. (2d)
732 (1943). For effect of a statute permitting employee to accept compensation payments
and also to sue the tort-feasor, see Porello v. United States, 153 F. (2d) 605, 608 (C. C. A. 2d,
1946) [interpreting the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 STAT.
1440 (1927), 52 STAT. 1168 (1938), 33 U. S. C. § 933 (1940)].
107. The Act is divided into four parts: (1) tite and definitions; (2) provisions for ad-
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the Act shall be the exclusive remedy against any Federal agency whether
or not authorized to sue and be sued in its own name. Section 424 repeals
certain statutes providing for the administrative settlement of small claims,
"in respect of claims cognizable under part 2 of this title." 's Since the
limiting exceptions are set out in part 4, the question arises whether sections
423 and 424 withdraw from the previously-granted jurisdiction only those
cases which are cognizable under this Act as restricted by the exceptions, or
withdraw all cases which would otherwise be cognizable under the broad
grant of jurisdiction of parts 2 and 3.
If the former interpretation is adopted, the sue-and-be-sued clauses and
the old administrative remedies remain available to claimants excluded from
recourse to the Tort Claims Act by its exceptions. This result can be sus-
tained as in line with the overall purpose of the Act to increase, rather than
decrease, government responsibility in tort,' which purpose militates
against an interpretation crippling previous specific relaxations of immunity.
Moreover, since part 2 of the Act is introduced with the phrase "Subject to
the limitations of this title," and part 3 begins "Subject to the provisions of
this title," it may be argued that those parts are required, by their wording,
to be construed as incorporating the exceptions of part 4, and, accordingly,
that sections 423 and 424 do not prevent resort to the earlier statutes au-
thorizing suit in cases where the exceptions would bar suit under the Tort
Claims Act.Y° However, the Act may be interpreted as abrogating previous
relaxations of immunity in cases cognizable under, or excepted from the
scope of, the Tort Claims Act. In support of this interpretation, it may be
argued that Congress has here laid out a comprehensive, well-reasoned
scheme of governmental liability for negligence, which it would be incon-
sistent to apply as the exclusive remedy against some departments, while
avoiding its limitations as to others by relying on the old sue-and-be-sued
clauses.
The report of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress makes
ministrative settlements; (3) provisions for judicial determinations; (4) provisions common
to parts 2 and 3. Both the exceptions and the sections relating to repeal of former statutes
are in part 4.
108. F. T. C. A. § 424(a).
109. See SEN. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) 29.
110. For citations to the sue-and-be-sued clauses see note 8 supra. It is doubtful that the
analysis above has more than a spurious validity, for the sue-and-be-sued clauses have them-
selves been so interpreted by the courts as to embrace most of the limitations imposed by the
exceptions in the Tort Claims Act. Thus, while the courts are not in agreement as to the
extent of tort liability incurred under the sue-and-be-sued clauses, no case has gone so far
as to permit suit questioning the legality of a statute or the wisdom of an exercise of discre-
tion. Cf. Pennell v. HOLC, 21 F. Supp. 497, 498 (D. C. Me. 1937); Grant v. TVA, 49 F.
Supp. 564 (E. D. Tenn. 1942). The leading case of Keifer & Keller v. RFC, 306 U. S. 381
(1939), does not suggest that the authority of the clause is unlimited. See in general Naglor,
Liability of the United States Government in Tort (1940) 14 TULAxg L. REv. 407, 417-20;
(1939) 23 Am. JuR., Foreign Corporations § 574; Note (1940) 125 A. L. R. 809, 814 (con-
siders only HOLC).
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it abundantly clear that, at least as to section 423 relating to the sue-and-be-
sued clauses, the former, grant of jurisdiction is intended to be entirely re-
moved in suits for money recovery sounding in tort, and claimants' exclusive
judicial remedy is to be against the United States under this Act."' Sec-
tion 424, relating to administrative settlements, is almost identical in word-
ing, but can be differentiated on several counts. The committee reports,
while clear as to the meaning ascribed to section 423, do not thus clarify
section 424,112 and a careful analysis of'sub-section 424(a) suggests that part
of that sub-section has no meaning unless the exceptions of part 4 of the
Act are read into part 2.1 l3 Moreover, the reasons motivating many of the
111. SEN. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) 33-4: "This will place torts of
'suable' agencies of the United States upon precisely the same footing as torts of 'nonsuable'
agencies ... and in both cases the exceptions of the bill would apply either by way of
preventing recovery at all or by way of leaving recovery to some other act, as, for example,
the Suits in Admiralty Act. It is intended that neither corporate status nor 'sue and be sued'
clauses shall, alone, be the basis for suits for money recovery sounding in tort." This lan-
guage was taken verbatim from the Report of the Committee on the Judiciary to accompany
S. 2221, H. R. REP. 2245,77th Cong., 2dSess. (1942) 11.
112. SEN. REP. No. 1400, op. cit. supra note 111, at 34: "This section [424] provides that
as to claims cognizable under part 2 of the title existing provisions of law authorizing ad-
ministrative adjustment of such claims are repealed. Provisions of law authorizing adjust-
ment of claims not cognizable under part 2 would remain unaffected as to such claims."
This leaves unanswered the question as to what claims are to be considered "cognizable
under part 2." The report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on the 1942 measure,
S. 2221, perhaps indicates that that bill was intended to repeal the former authority over
claims falling within the exceptions. It reads: ". . . claims which occur prior to the effective
date of the bill; claims which may, irrespective of negligence, be adjusted under existing law,
and claims not cognizable under the bill for any other reason, may be considered and deter-
mined by the Federal agencies under existing law as at present. However, claims based
upon the negligence of a Federal employee acting within the scope of his authority and
cognizable under Title II [Part 2] of the bill are to be presented for administrative adjust-
ment solely under this bill." SEN. REP. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 8. (S. 2221, as
reported, included claims only for "negligent," and not for "wrongful," acts.)
113. F. T. C. A. § 424(a). The first clauses of the subsection repeal former provisions of
law authorizing settlements by Federal agencies where the jurisdictional limitations of this
act apply, i.e., where the injury or damage was "caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of an employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment . . .", after which there is added: ". . . in respect of claims cognizable under
part 2 of this title.. . ." The last quoted clause has no meaning unless there are some acts
caused by the negligent or wrongful act of an employee which are not cognizable under
part 2. Such acts can only be those which are included within the exceptions, and as to them
the former authority is not repealed.
For example, one of the statutes specifically mentioned in § 424(a) authorizes the Attor-
ney General to determine any claims up to $500 for damages caused by an agent of the FBI
acting within the scope of his employment. No negligence or wrongfulness is required by the
statute. 49 STAT. 1184 (1936), 31 U. S. C. § 224(b) (1940). Sec. 424 of the Tort Claims Act
repeals this grant of authority only as to cases caused by a negligent or wrongful act, so that
the Attorney General presumably may still allow a claim for damages caused by an agent
while legitimately pursuing his duties. But since false arrest is excepted from the Act,
§ 421(h), and therefore not cognizable under part 2, it would appear that the Attorney
General may also continue to settle claims up to $500 for a wronzful false arrest.
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exceptions are applicable only to part 3, providing for court trials with un-
limited recovery and are inapplicable to an administrative settlement with a
$1000 limit."14 For these reasons it is possible that the courts will permit no
actions in tort against the sue-and-be-sued agencies, whereas the heads of
departments may continue to settle some claims, excluded from this Act
by the exceptions, under authority of previous grants of jurisdiction.
The Act nowhere mentions its effect upon certain of the existing statutes
authorizing suit against the Governlent for limited classes of torts, such as
that granting to the Court of Claims exclusive jurisdiction of actions for
patent infringement or for damage to oyster beds from dredging opera-
tions.'15 Cases will probably arise which might give a choice of remedies
either under one of the old statutes or under the new Act.' By the familiar
doctrine that the more recent Act controls, the courts could hold in that
event that the sole remedy lay under the Tort Claims Act. Or by following
the doctrine that when there are two conflicting statutes upon the same sub-
ject, one general and the other specific, the specific statute governs without
regard to priority of enactment,'17 the courts could easily avoid the conflict
by holding patent infringement and damage to oyster beds unaffected by the
Tort Claims Act." 8 Even if this course is not followed, the old Acts cannot
be held entirely repealed by implication, for many cases arising thereunder
The construction here contended for is in some cases almost inescapable, For example,
the Secretary of War was authorized by an act in 1942, loc. cit. supra note 97, to settle claims
arising in a foreign country out of the activities of his department. Section 421(k) of this
Act excepts any claim arising in a foreign country. Unless the repealing clause of section 424
is intended to be read in the light of this exception, then, as to claims arising out of the
negligence of a soldier abroad, all administrative authority to settle has been repealed. Such
an interpretation will necessarily lead to a renewed flood of private claim bills, a result whiclh
it is believed Congress did not intend.
114. Thus the danger of large judgments, the undesirability of court trials, to a large
extent the inconvenience of a multiplicity of claims, are here of minor importance. This
argument does not suggest any extention of the powers of settlement of the agencies Into
new and possibly dangerous fields. It is merely directed at not permitting this Act to restrict
the authority which the agencies have been exercising under previous statutes. See note 7
supra.
115. 36 STAT. 851 (1910), 40 STAT. 705 (1918), 35 U. S. C. § 68 (1940) (patent infringe-
ment). 49 STAT. 1049 (1935), 57 STAT. 553 (1943), 28 U. S. C. § 250(a) (Supp. 1946) (oyster
beds); see Schroeder Besse Oyster Co. v. United States, 95 Ct. Cl. 729 (1942).
116. The opinions differ as to whether the infringement of a patent is a tort or a "taking."
Compare Crozier v. Krupp, 224 U. S. 290 (1912), with Keifer & Keifer v. RFC, 306 U. S.
381, 396 (1939); cf. Schillinger v. United States, 155 U. S. 163 (1894). But if the infringe-
ment of a patent is held to be a "wrongful act" within the meaning of this statute, and
it does appear to be included in that phrase, then in every case it may become necessary to
resolve a conflict of jurisdiction between the Court of Claims and the Federal District court
in terms of whether or not the case falls within the scope of the first exception, discussed
supra p. 543 et seg.
117. Townsend v. Little, 109 U. S. 504 (1883); Missouri v. Ross, 299 U. S. 72, 76 (1936);
Iriartev. United States, 157 F. (2d) 105, 108 (C. C. A. 1st, 1946).
118. That these statutes were not listed as exceptions, as were those governing maritime
torts, supra note 6, weakens this argument.
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will not be within the terms of the new statute.'" It is to be hoped that the
silence of Congress will be interpreted as giving claimant his choice of reme-
dies in a proper case, rather than requiring him to justify the jurisdiction of
whichever court he elected in terms of the mutual exclusiveness of the Acts.1:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
The clear purpose of the Act is to prescribe the same substantive rules as
are applicable ordinarily between private litigants in the Federal district
courts. In all cases the rights of claimants are to be determined "in accord-
ance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 121 There
is no separate interpretation of this provision, so that the place of the tort,
if doubtful, must be decided in accordance with applicable common law
doctrines.' 22 The United States is to be liable whenever a private person in
like circumstances would be, and, in cases in the district courts, "to the same
claimants, in the same manner, and to the same extent . . . except . . . for
interest prior to judgment and for punitive damages." 123 Thus the doctrine
of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins 124 is written into the act, and no special rules of
substantive law are invoked.
25
119. Any infringement of a patent done pursuant to a statute or as a result of the exer-
cise of a discretionary function would be excluded by the first exception. F.T.C.A. § 421(a).
No such limitation is written into the acts cited, note 115 supra.
120. Hammond v. United States, 95 Ct. Cl. 464, 42 F. Supp. 284 (1942); Brothers v.
United States, 52 Ct. CI. 462 (1917), affd, 250 U. S. 88 (1919); E. IV. Bliss Co. v. United
States, 53 Ct Cl. 47 (1917), aftd, 253 U. S. 187 (1920); Cramp & Sons v. Internat. Curtis
Turbine Co., 246 U. S. 28, 41 (1918) semble. These cases suggest that a suit against the
Government arising out of a patent infringement may, in a proper case, be brought under
either the Act of 1910 or the Tucker Act, as on an implied contract. The jurisdictional con-
flict hag not been acute in this situation, since original jurisdiction under both statutes lies
in the Court of Claims, and appellate procedure is the same. United States v. Esnault-
Pelterie, 303 U. S. 26 (1938), aff'g 84 Ct. Cl. 625 (1937); Hammond v. United States, 95
Ct. Cl. 464,42 F. Supp. 284 (1942). However, the possible conflict between the Act of 1910
and the Tort Claims Act will be a vital issue in every case. Cf. discussion pp. 550-3 supra.
See Zeller Marine Corp. v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 447 (S. D. N. Y. 1946), and cases
cited, for examples of the conflicts between the Acts of 1920 and 1925, loe. cit. supra note 6,
and the Tucker Act, loc. cit. supra note 4.
121. F.T.C.A. §§ 403(a), 410(a).
122. See 2 CooLEY, ToRTs § 345, esp. p. 547; GoODuCH, HANDBOO1 OF TaE Co.iFLicr
OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) § 90; Cook, Tort Liability and the Conflid of Laws (1935) 35 COL. L.
REv. 202.
123. F.T.C.A.§410(a).
124. 304 U. S. 64 (1938). See Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 47 YALE.
L. J. 1336; Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie r.
Tompkins (1946) 55 YALE L. J. 267.
125. The single exception is that the United States "shall not be liable for interest prior
to judgment or for punitive damages." F. T. C. A. § 410(a). Obedience to the local law is a
departure from some of the earlier bills. Note 10 supra. Thus the measures considered in
1940, S. 2690 and H. R. 7236, incorporated provisions designed to offset the effect of Erie
R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), by establishing a certain uniformty in the law of
Government liability; viz., contributory negligence a complete defense; only pro-rata la-
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While procedure will generally be the same as between private litigants,
the Government is protected by several specific provisions.'28
Proceedings in the Federal District Courts. Venue of an action is laid in
either the federal district court of plaintiff's residence or of the place of the
tort, including the Territories and possessions.2' The court is to sit without
a jury.12 8
Several problems arise from the fact that pursuant to the authority of this
statute the courts will be acting as an arm of the legislative department of
the Government 129 and not under the constitutional grant of judicial au-
thority."' They will be sitting as courts of claims l3' and as such will be
governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as applied to proceedings
in the district courts under the Tucker Act. Section 411 of the Act affirms
the applicability of the Rules without any expressed limitation. However,
the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Sherwood 1I
will probably be held controlling. In that case the Court held that the Fed-
eral Rules applied only to the manner of exercising jurisdiction and could
not be used to increase jurisdiction."' Therefore joinder of parties was not
permitted 114 where it had the effect, by bringing in a third party as co-
defendant with the United States, of giving the court jurisdiction of a con-
troversy between private parties which it could not otherwise have con-
sidered.
bility if joint tort-feasors, etc. See sections 302 and 306, S. 2690 and H. R. 7236, reprinted
in the Congressional hearings on those bills. Compare Hearings before the House Committee
on the Judiciary on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 61.
126. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are prescribed. F. T. C. A. § 411. But see
discussion infra as to joinder of parties, counterclaims, effect of proceedings on subsequent
actions against the Government, etc.
127. F.T.C.A.§410(a).
128. Ibid. The constitutionality of this provision is not open to question, for, having the
power to retain complete immunity, the Government is free to relax it on terms. McElrath
v. United States, 102 U. S. 426 (1880). See Hearings before the House Committee on the. Judi-
ciary on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1042) 21.
129. U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8. See Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553 (1933).
130. U.S. CONST., Art. III, § 1.
131. Cf. Bates Mfg. Co. v. United States, 303 U.S. 567 (1938); United States v. Pfitsch,
256 U. S. 547 (1921).
132. 312 U. S. 584 (1941), rev'g Sherwood v. United States, 112 F. (2d) 587 (C. C. A.
2d, 1940).
133. Id.at89-90.
134. Assuming unrestricted application of the Federal Rules to proceedings under this
Act, joinder of the responsible employee, or of a joint tort-feasor, as co-defendant with the
Government, would be permissible, under Rule 20. Bailey v. Zlotnick, 133 F. (2d) 35 (App.
D. C. 1942). In 1940, prior to the final decision in United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584
(1941), Mr. Holtzoff, Assistant to the Attorney General, thought that joinder of parties
would be permitted. Hearings before Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 3690, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 45; Holtzoff, Procedural Rules When Government is Litigant (1940)
26 A. B. A. J. 391, 392. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was of the same
opinion. Sherwood v. United States, 112 F. (2d) 587 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
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The Sherwood case can be distinguished on the grounds that it applies to
the Tucker Act, which was adopted long before the Federal Rules,"' whereas
this Act is written with those Rules in mind and expressly invokes their con-
trol. Therefore any expansion of jurisdiction involved in giving the Rules
full effect can be held to have been granted by Congresg and not by the
Rules themselves. This argument is answered in part by reference to the
committee report on the bill considered in 1942 which, citing the Sherwood
case, 3 interprets identical words to mean that no joinder is intended.
Furthermore, serious procedural difficulties would be raised by permitting
joinder of parties. For the constitutional guarantee of a jury 13- is applicable
to controversies between individuals and could not be denied to a third
party joint tort-feasor or to the employee of the Government who com-
mitted the tort, by the device of joining him as a defendant with the United
States. 3 Therefore it seems inevitable that the rights of plaintiff and of the
Government against others will have to be adjudicated in a separate con-
troversy.
Counterclaims by the United States are to be governed by the applicable
provisions of the Tucker Act." 9 That act in effect gives to the courts juris-
diction to hear any demand whatsoever by the Government as a set-off or
counterclaim against plaintiff, and has been frequently and liberally inter-
preted.140 But jurisdiction to hear the counterclaim fails when the original
135. The Tucker Act was passed in 1887, the Federal Rules adopted in 1938, and the
Sherwood case decided in 1941.
136. The committee report on the amended version of S. 2221, which in all relevant
respects is copied verbatim in the present Act, reads: "It is intended that the district courts
in exercising jurisdiction under this title shall exercise essentially the same type of jurisdic-
tion as district courts exercise concurrently with the Court of Claims of the United States
under the Tucker Act... . The bill therefore does not permit any person to be joined as a
defendant with the United States and does not lift the immunity of the United States from
tort actions except as jurisdiction is specifically conferred upon the district courts by this
bill. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584 (1941); Lynn v. United States, 110 F.
(2d) 586, 588 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940); Waite v. United States, 57 Ct. Cl. 46 (1922); Jackson v.
United States, 27 Ct. Cl. 74, 84 (1891). The phrase 'as a court of claims' in section 301 of
the Senate bill [section 410(a) of this Act] was deleted as surplusage." H. R. REP. No. 2245,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 9. See also Hearings before the House Comnzilee on Ihe Judiciary
on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463, 77th Cong. 2d Sess. (1942) 21-3.
137. U.S. CONsT. AmEND. VII.
138. If joinder were permitted and the individual defendant refused to waive his right
to a jury, a constitutional issue would be presented. Cf. Lynn v. United States, 110 F. (2d)
586, 588-9 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940). The objection could be met only by separating the trials,
thus defeating the joinder, or by conducting a single trial with the jury being concerned only
with the liability of the individual, the judge acting independently as to the liability of the
United States.
139. F.T.C.A. §411.
140. 24 STAT. 505 (1887), 28 U. S. C. § 250 (2) (1940). The statute confers jurisdiction
on the Court of Claims over "All set-offs, counterclaims, claims for damages, whether
liquidated or unliquidated, or other demands whatsoever on the part of the Government of
the United States against any claimant against the Government in said court... ." See
Cherry Cotton Mills v. United States, 66 Sup. Ct. 729, 730 (U. S. 1946); Allen v. United
19471
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
claim is dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 141 and the counterclaim must be
against only the parties to the original action.142 However, the counter-
claim need not arise out of the same transaction,' and it may be in an
amount greater than plaintiff sues for. 14
4
The Act does not enlarge the very limited right of counterclaim against
the United States. Two comparatively recent Supreme Court decisions "I
limit that right as follows: (1) No counterclaim which would require an
affirmative money judgment against the United States may be heard unless
the court in which it is brought could have had jurisdiction of the claim in an
original suit.1 46 (2) No counterclaim may be heard unless it arises out of the
same transaction as that on which the Government bases its cause of action,
or unless the court could have had original jurisdiction. 147 Since the Govern-
ment cannot bring suit in the Federal district court sitting as a court of
claims without a jury, as authorized by this Act, 48 torts may be pleaded as
counterclaims only in amounts which will not result in judgments against
the United States and only when the Government's suit is on the same
transaction.'49
States, 204 U. S. 581 (1907); Wisconsin Central R. R. v. United States, 164 U. S. 190 (1896);
cf. Ex parle Skinner and Eddy Corp., 265 U. S. 86 (1929).
141. Kelleam v. Md. Casualty Co., 312 U. S. 377 (1941); Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v.
United States, 34 Ct. CI. 484, 502 (1899). However, lack of jurisdiction over the original
claim will not defeat jurisdiction as to the counterclaim if the court could have exercised
original jurisdiction over the counterclaim. Isenberg v. Biddle, 125 F. (2d) 741, 743 (App.
D. C. 1941). Since suits under this Act will be brought in the district courts sitting specially
as courts of claim without a jury, those courts as such could not have exercised original
jurisdiftion over a claim by the United States, and therefore cannot adjudicate the Govern-
ment's counterclaim if plaintiff's cause of action is not supported by the Act, See supra
p. 554.
142. Marietta Mfg. Co. v. United States, 61 Ct. Cl. 122 (1925).
143. Florida Cent. & P. R. R. v. United States, 43 Ct. Cl. 572 (1908).
144. REv. STAT. § 1061 (1875); 28 U. S. C. § 252 (1940); McElrath v. United Stateo, 102
U. S. 426 (1880).
145. United States v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495 (1940); United States v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co., 309 U. S. 506 (1940).
146. Ibid. See also United States v. Davidson, 139 F. (2d) 908 (C. C. A, 5th, 1943);
United, States v. Dugan Bros., 36 F. Supp. 109 (E. D. N. Y. 1941) (revised opinion); ef.
United States v. Dry Dock Savings Institution, 149 F. (2d) 917 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945); United
States, for Use of Mutual Metal Mfg. Co. v. Biggs, 46 F. Supp. 8 (E. D. 11. 1942).
147. See cases cited note 145 supra. See also In re Monongahela Rye Liquors, 141 F.
(2d) 864 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944).
148. See supra p. 554.
149. In the majority of jurisdictions, where contributory negligence is a valid defense
against the entire claim, there will be no advantage to a defendant sued by the Government
in pleading negligence of the Government employee as a counterclaim. For if both parties
were negligent, there will be no recovery; if the Government alone was negligent, defendant
will have to bring suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act. He cannot collect on a counter-
claim, because the court in which he was being sued by the Government would not be sitting
as a court of claims with statutory authority to render judgments against the Government.
See cases cited supra note 146.
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Claimant's action in the district court is further governed by several
special provisions. Suit may be brought upon a claim filed with an agency
for consideration and settlement, if the claim is denied or the award re-
fused. 50 But the complaint cannot be filed until after final action has been
taken by the agency or until fifteen days after notice of withdrawal of the
claim from such agency.15' If a claim once presented to an agency is later
taken to court, the amount sued for can be no greater than the sum pre-
viously demanded of the agency, unless the increase is based upon newly
discovered evidence or intervening facts. 5 2 A one year statute of limitations
is adopted, but is extended to a date six months after final disposition of a
claim by an agency or after notice of withdraval." 33 The Attorney General
is authorized to "arbitrate, compromise, or settle any claim cognizable under
[part 3], after the institution of suit thereon, with the approval of the court
in which such suit is pending." 154 Appeal lies to the Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals or, with the written consent of all appellees, to the Court of Claims
which will then have the same duties and powers as the Circuit Courts. 5
Payment of any judgment rendered by the court shall be made by the Gen-
eral Accounting Office. 55
Administrative Awards. The provisions governing administrative settle-
ment when the claim is not in excess of $1,000 157 are explicit and raise no
problems of interpretation. The claim must be filed with the agency in
150. F. T. C. A. § 410(b). The objection that an earlier bill wmas too generous to claim-
ants in preserving a right to sue if dissatisfied with the administrator's award xas answered
by analogizing the administrative remedy to an attempt at settlement between private
parties. See Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 5373 and H. R.
6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 32.
151. F. T. C. A. § 410(b). Further: "Disposition of any claim [by an agency] shall not
be competent evidence of liability or amount of damages in proceedings on such claim [in a
Federal district court]." Ibid.
152. Ibid.
153. F.T.C.A. § 420.
154. F.T.C.A. § 413. This provision is taken from the acts permitting suits in admiralty
against the Government for maritime torts, where it is thought to have been successful. See
Hearings before the Senate CommiUee on 1te Judiciary on S. 2690, 76th Cong., 3d Sies. (1940)
37.
155. F. T. C. A. § 412. This provision was added to the 1942 bill, partly because of a
casual suggestion made by President F. D. Roosevelt. See H. R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1942) 6, 11. However, it also represents a compromise between a desire for uni-
formity in appellate decisions and a feeling that claimants have a right to the convenience
of a local appellate tribunal. No advantage between the procedures other than geographical
location is apparent, unless the various courts are more or less generous to claimants. See
Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 17-9.
156. F. T. C. A. § 411. The Act provides that the same provisions for payment of judg-
ments shall be applicable as in cases brought under the Tucker Act. See RE%,. STAT. §§ 236,
1089 (1875), as amended 43 STAT. 939 (1925), 31 U. S. C. § 225 (1940); 33 STAr'. 41 (1904),
as amended 42 STaT. 24 (1921), 31 U. S. C. § 228 (1940).
157. F.T.C.A. Part 2.
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writing within one year of its accrual. 158 No provision is made as to the
manner in which the claim is to be filed or the information which must be
given.' 59 The decision on the claim is to be made by the head of the agency
or his designee for the purpose,16 and in the absence of fraud that decision
will be binding on all officers of the Government. 6 ' While the agencies are
directed to observe the local law and presumably will take due consideration
of judicial interpretations of the statute, no provision is made for appeal
from, or supervision of, the agencies' exercise of jurisdiction, or for promot-
ing uniformity of treatment. 16 2
Payment shall be made "by the head of the Federal agency concerned out
of appropriations that may be made therefor, which appropriations are
hereby authorized." 163 And finally, the head of each agency is directed to
report annually to Congress on all claims paid.'14
Effect of Judgment ot Award. The acceptance of any award made by an
agency or of any settlement by the Attorney General
". .. shall be final and conclusive on the claimant, and shall con-
stitute a complete release by the claimant of any claim against the
United States and against the employee of the Government ...
by reason of the same subject matter." 165
The Act further provides, in regard to suits brought under section 410(a),
"The judgment in such an action shall constitute a complete bar to
any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter,
against the employee of the Government . ,, 16
158. F.T.C.A. § 420.
159. There was some discussion in the hearings on earlier bills to require filing, at least of
a notice of intention to claim, within a few weeks of the occurrence giving rise to the claim,
in order to give the Government an opportunity to prepare a defense while witnesses and
evidence could still be located. This plan was not adopted, presumably because a short
statute of limitations would inevitably lead to the filing of a large number of private claim
bills in Congress, and because most Government departments require their employees to
file reports of all accidents immediately after they occur. This will be sufficient notice to
protect the department in most cases. See Hearings before Senate Committee on the J11diciary
on S. 2690, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 47.
160. F.T.C.A. § 403(a).
161. F.T.C.A.§403(b).
162. Some earlier bills provided that the Attorney General should prescribe criteria to
be followed by the various agencies. See Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judi.
ciary on S. 2690, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 42. That provision was deleted in 1942, to-
gether with a companion section which provided for review by the Attorney General of all
claims settled by the agencies in amounts between $500 and $1,000. See Hearings before the
House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 5.173 and H. R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942)
10, 12. While there is now no provision for review, claimant is free to refuse any award and
take the matter to court. See note 150 supra.
163. F.T.C.A. § 403(c).
164. F. T. C. A. § 404. This provision will enable Congress to keep itself informed of the
relative generosity to claimants of the heads of agencies.
165. F.T.C.A. § 403(d).
166. F.T.C.A. § 410(b).
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In respect to further action against the Government, the acceptance of an
award or settlement would probably have been held an accord and satisfac-
tion even without the statutory command, 10 but the question is here defi-
nitely settled. The effect of a judgment on further action against the Gov-
ernment or its agencies is not prescribed by the Act and will depend on rules
of res judicata.16
As against the employee, the provision relative to acceptance of an award
is again little more than a statement of prevailing law.C1 The same will be
true in most jurisdictions of the provision as to judgments. That sentence
clearly applies only to judgments rendered on the merits and should not be
interpreted as referring to any judgment by which the court denies its juris-
diction.170 This intent is evidenced in the committee hearings on earlier
bills.'7 ' Further, the rule is applied only to "such an action," thus including
all the restrictions previously found applicable to section 410(a).172 On the
other hand, if the court denies recovery because of a finding of fact that no
negligence or wrongfulness has been proved, its finding will be a bar to any
later action against the employee arising out of the same cause of action.173
167. Mason v. United States, 17 Wall. 67 (U. S. 1872); Note (1913) 42 L. R. A. (.;.s.)
111,113.
168. The Act forbids suits against any agency on a claim which may be brought against
the United States. F. T. C. A. § 423. See discussion p. 549 el seq., supra. Normally a judg-
ment against claimant would preclude any further action by him against the Government an
the same cause of action. For effect of judgment where decision is based on lack of jurisdic-
tion, see infra, note 170. In that event, if some other remedy were available to claimant, as
under the act authorizing suit for patent infringement, supra note 115, he presumably could
seek satisfaction under the alternative remedy. See discussion supra p. 552. Or if the lack
of jurisdiction were based upon a holding that a responsible Government corporation was
not a "Federal agency" within the definition of section 402(a), suit could presumably be in-
stituted against the corporation under the sue-and-be-sued clause. See supra p. 538.
169. By the weight of authority, a release of either master or serv-ant operates to release
the other, where both are liable to a third party for a tort of the servant. MacDonald v.
Henry Hornblower and Weeks, 268 Mich. 626, 256 N. NV. 572 (1934). See Note (1940) 126
A. L. R. 1199, and cases there collected.
170. Such a judgment cannot be res judicata of the issues involved in the action. Gould
v. Evansville & C. R. R., 91 U. S. 526 (1875); additional cases collected (1924) 34 C. J.
§ 1193n.
171. See Hearings before 1t House Committee on the Judiciary on H. .R. 5373 and H. .
6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 9. The Assistant Attorney General testified: "If the Gov-
ernment has satisfied a claim which is made on account of a collision between a truck carry-
ing mail and a private car, that should, in our judgment, be the end of it. After the claimant
has obtained satisfaction of his claim from the Government, either by judgment or by an
administrative award, he should not be able to turn around and sue the driverof the truck."
172. See discussion as to jurisdictional issues, supra p. 537 et seq. Cf. Olzla. Gas & Elect.
Co. v. Okla. Packing Co., 292 U. S. 386 (1934), for comparative treatment of similar lan-
guage.
173. F. T. C. A. § 410(b), quoted supra p. 558. Even in the absence of such a statutory
command, it is almost universally held that a judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction
in an action against the master will be a bar to the same plaintiff in a subsequent action
against the servant, where the issue in dispute is identical. Jenkins v. Atl. C. Line R. R.,
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No mention is made in the Act as to the rights of the claimant against a
third party joint tort-feasor, and those rights will accordingly depend en-
tirely on local law. That no joinder will be permitted has been argued else-
where,' 74 and plaintiff will have to seek his remedy in a separate action. By
the terms of the statute the acceptance of an administrative award from the
Federal agency involved will constitute an accord and satisfaction with the
Government, 17 5 and in nearly all jurisdictions this will bar further recovery
by plaintiff from any joint tort-feasors. 175
The Act presents no peculiar problems as to the Government's rights of
subrogation against the employee, or of contribution or indemnity from a
joint tort-feasor, save that joinder is not allowed and, accordingly, the rules
applicable to private litigants will be determinative.'"
One provision of the Act of no complexity but considerable professional
interest is that relating to attorney's fees. It is provided that the court ren-
dering judgment, or the Attorney General in reaching a compromise, or the
Federal agency approving a claim,
".. . may, as a part of the judgment, award, or settlement, deter-
mine and allow reasonable attorney's fees, which, if the recovery is
$500 or more, shall not exceed 10 percent of the amount recovered
under part 2, or 20 percent of the amount recovered under part 3,
to be paid out of but not in addition to the amount of the judgment,
award, or settlement. . . . Any attorney who charges, demands,
receives, or collects for services rendered in connection with such
claim any amount in excess of that allowed under this section, if
recovery be had, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, upon
conviction thereof, be subject to a fine of not more than $2,000 or
imprisonment for not more than one year, or both." I
89 S. C. 408, 412, 71 S. E. 1010, 1012 (1911); Notes (1941) 133 A. L. R. 181, 192-9, (1924)
31 A. L. R.'194, and cases there cited.
174. Supra pp. 554-5.
175. F.T.C.A. § 403(c). And see authorities cited supra note 167.
176. In a few jurisdictions the effect of an accord and satisfaction with one joint tort-
feasor is held to depend upon the intention of the contracting parties, but the general rule is
that it will operate to discharge other joint tort-feasors. Tanana Trading Co. v. North
American Trading and Transportation Co., 220 Fed. 783 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915); Snyder v.
Mutual Tel. Co., 135 Iowa 215, 112 N. W. 776 (1907), additional cases collected (1936)
1 C. J. S., Accord and Satisfaction § 13.
177. The Government clearly would have a valid claim against the employee. See
PROSSER ON ToRTs (1941) 1114 n. 36; 2 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 401, comment (c).
However, in hearings on an earlier bill a representative of the Department of Justice testified
that defense of such suits by the Government was necessary for the good morale of its em-
ployees, and that probably disciplinary rather than legal or financial steps would be taken
against an employee too often delinquent. See Hearings before House Judiciary Committee on
H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 9-10. The Government's success in
seeking indemnity from a joint tort-feasor will vary with the jurisdiction. In general see
PROSSER ON TORTS (1941) 1111-7; Gregory, Procedural Aspects of Securing Tort Contribution
in the Injured Plaintiff's Action (1933) 47 HARv. L. REV. 209. See H. R. RE,. No. 2245, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 12.
178. F.T.C.A. § 422.
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It will be observed that the authority to fix the fee is permissive, but the
penalty for charging more than the statutory maximum applies whether or
not the fee be fixed, and that the penalty applies only "if recovery be had." '
CONCLUSION
The Federal Tort Claims Act is clearly a major step in the process of lay-
ing to rest the doctrine of sovereign immunity. While the Act's exceptions
are very broad and will in some measure defeat the aims of eliminating
private claim bills from Congress, they appear to be for the most part well
taken, at least until experience with the Act indicates to what extent Gov-
ernmental immunity should be further relaxed.
The most difficult problem now facing a suitor against the Government
stems from the multiplicity of statutes authorizing suit. As has been in-
dicated in this discussion, considerable overlap exists between some of these
measures. Perhaps in time Congress will substitute for them one comprehen-
sive statute. Meanwhile the courts are faced with the problem of co-ordinat-
ing the interpretations of existing laws so as to achieve their objectives with
the minimum conflict.
179. In committee hearings on previous bills this provision was explained as being in
conformity with stipulations usually found in private bills passed by Congress. It vas
further defended on the ground that defendant here is solvent, a fact said to warrant de-
creasing the average contingent fee. The provision was bitterly attacked in letters from
various bar associations, one of which alleged that the provision would have the practical
effect of dosing the courts to claimants. See Hearings before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary on S. 2690, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 14-6, 40-1; Hearings before House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary on H. 1. 7236, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 13, 22. "The limitation
upon attorney's fees would of course be exclusive of actual disbursements made or incurred
on behalf of the client." H. R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 10.
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